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The Security Council in Practice: 
Haiti, Cholera, and the Elected Members of the United Nations Security Council 
Rosa Freedman1 and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert2 
Abstract: While the cholera outbreak in Haiti still claims victims every month, it is also the 
backdrop of one of the biggest legal battles the UN has been engaged in – one for the recognition 
of harm caused and for reparations for victims of cholera. Having used its immunity to disengage 
from the issue, the UN finally changed its stance in December 2016 and apologised for the 
organisation’s role in the cholera outbreak. This article analyses the role of the elected members 
of the Security Council – alongside other key stakeholders – in contributing to the UN’s change 
of policy. Based on privileged access to a number of actors in this politico-legal fight, this article 
argues that elected members of the Security Council have played a crucial role in pushing the UN 
to ‘do the right thing’. This article, along with other contributions to this special issue, sheds a 
different light on the practices inside the Security Council, demonstrating that elected members 
are far from being powerless, as most of the literature on the subject tends to assume. They can 
successfully play a significant role inside the organisation when the right conditions permit them 
to play this role. Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, Non-Permanent Members, 
Haiti, Cholera 
 
Introduction 
In December 2016, Ban Ki-Moon apologised to the Haitian people for the organisation’s role in 
the cholera outbreak in the country that has killed more than 10,000 Haitians to this day. That 
apology was the first time that he or the UN publicly acknowledged its role in bringing cholera to 
Haiti. The decision to apologise directly to the Haitian people is a first, not just in the context of 
Haiti, which has gone through a number of scandals involving UN personnel, including cases of 
sexual exploitation and abuse by UN soldiers and police officers; it is also the first time an acting 
Secretary General apologised directly to a population subject to a peace operation,3 and it is 
important that Ban Ki-Mon did so in Creole, the national language in Haiti. The apology 
constituted a complete volte face in UN policy on Haiti and cholera: until August 2016 the UN had 
denied any involvement in the cholera outbreak.   
This change of policy is the product of a combination of actors and campaigns coming together 
to push the UN to do “what is right” for Haiti and for the Haitian people. This article is the first 
to record the politico-legal fight waged outside of the UN and inside the Security Council, based 
on the perspective of actors who have contributed directly to that fight for justice. We will focus 
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on the number of initiatives that have contributed to change the UN’s position on the cholera 
issue, including the strategic litigation, parallel initiatives, and debates inside the UN Security 
Council. In the middle of this, we can find the elected members of the Security Council. In line 
with this special issue, we will focus particularly on elected members of the Security Council and 
their crucial role in bringing this issue to the fore in New York. The existing literature focuses on 
the marginal power of the elected members of the Security Council,4 and fails to account for the 
fluid role of actors inside the Security Council. As David Ambrosetti brilliantly analysed, diplomats 
at the United Nations Security Council deploy a ‘practical sense’ when confronted with a crisis, 
with their priority being the preservation of their decisional positions.5 These positions are never 
definitely set in stone and are constantly subject to an everyday reproduction of influence. In vying 
for positions of influence inside the Security Council, diplomatic practices follow less logical 
reasonings and strategic calculus than being driven by general narratives diplomats perceive as 
legitimate, as well as the likely reception of their position from international and local audiences. 
When permanent members of the Security Council do not seize themselves of a specific issue 
(championing or blocking an issue), this opens up possibilities for elected members to fill in the 
gap and play a position of influence in specific issues. While the P3 (3 of the permanent members 
– France, the UK, and the US – are an informal alliance within the five permanent members) 
supported, in principle, a political solution to the issue, the potential implications of the legal fight 
waged in US courts by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) pushed them to 
the sidelines. Rather than an instrumentalization of the Security Council by the permanent three 
(the UK, the US and France), which we see in so many occasions,6 we have witnessed an 
instrumentalization of the Security Council by the elected members of the Council.  
The general view on instrumentalization of the Security Council, especially based on discursive 
practices inside the organisation, implies a (negative) politicisation of the Council, or the Council 
being used for political means or as a political tool. However, the politicisation of the Council does 
not have to be understood negatively. It is a natural extension of the rising authority of the 
organisation,7 where views and positions are bitterly contested and disputed by a growing number 
of actors. As such, the Security Council is constituted through the (political) everyday practices of 
actors in its midst. In order to understand the crucial role of elected members of the Security 
Council in pushing for a resolution of the cholera issue, we will first analyse the UN’s initial stance 
on the issue, and the resistance this position created in Haiti and elsewhere. The narrow focus on 
legal immunity by the UN, especially by its Department of Legal Affairs, led to a legal challenge 
by the IJDH and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), and a series of parallel diplomatic 
activities pressuring the UN to change its stance on the issue. This in turn led to a UN Security 
Council meeting in March 2016, where the cholera issue was particularly debated. In parallel, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, wrote a very 
influential report on the cholera issue in August 2016, pressuring the UN to change its stance. 
Around the same time, the office of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged that the United 
Nations played a role in the initial outbreak and that a ‘significant new set of U.N. actions’ will be 
needed to respond to the crisis.8 The UN Secretary General issued an official apology a few months 
later, in December 2016. That apology was delivered as part of a resolution framework that 
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included commitments to contain cholera and to provide remedies in some form.9 The apology 
itself is unlikely to be considered legally as an admission or assumption of responsibility, although 
this is an issue that needs further research and analysis; but it is a key political step to 
acknowledging the harms caused by the cholera epidemic and to rebuilding the relationship 
between the UN and communities affected by cholera. While it is impossible to isolate the 
influence of a specific actor or organisation in pushing the UN to change its stance, this article will 
analyse the diplomatic activities that preceded, happened during, and followed after the UN 
Security Council meeting in March 2016, looking at how different actors’ agendas coalesced to 
pressure the UN to finally apologise to the Haitian victims and to take specific steps to address 
the compensation issue. We argue that the role of the elected members of the UN Security Council 
was clearly instrumental in pushing the issue forward, demonstrating the broad regional support 
of a different line from the UN than silencing the debate by using its diplomatic immunity.  
This article is informed by a practice-based approach, looking at the dynamic analysis of 
interactions that contributed to change the Secretary General’s approach to the issue. In doing so, 
and thanks to the unprecedented access to which the authors of this article benefited, the article 
traces the agency of actors involved, helping us to understand the specific change of policy that 
took place in 2016. While most other similar articles on Security Council practices are aimed at 
theory development,10 this article’s main aim is to bring the complexity of the social interactions 
to the foreground, enabling us to have a better perspective on the role of elected members of the 
Security Council in the context of the specific cholera crisis in Haiti. The article relies on semi-
directive interviews with political experts operating in think-tanks gravitating around the UN, as 
well as participant observation with country delegations at the UN. The authors have met in 
February-March 2016 the diplomatic representations at the UN of Canada, Chile, France, Haiti, 
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, the UK, the US, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. This selection of delegations is informed by the need to include a good cross-regional 
representation of countries interested in Haitian issues in the conversation, including countries 
currently members of the Security Council or seeking membership of the Security Council. This 
article also relies on extensive interview material gathered in conversation with the IJDH - the legal 
representatives of victims of cholera in Haiti.  
This article is divided into four main sections. The first section looks at the literature on practices 
in the UN Security Council, looking at how a specific strand of the literature has marginalised the 
role of elected members of the Security Council and how a practice perspective can help nuance 
this by looking at the Security Council as a lived space, of course dominated by the permanent 
members, but where the elected members can also play a vital role in pushing specific agendas to 
the fore. The following sections are informed by the practice perspective to look at how the 
interplay of actors led to a change inside the organisation. The second section looks at the initial 
stance of the UN over the cholera issue, as well as the legal challenge of the IJDH/BAI, 
constituting the backdrop for a broader political fight to change the UN’s stance on the issue. The 
third section looks at the conflation of different actors pushing for a change of the UN’s position, 
including a vocal awareness campaign led by IJDH/BAI, the work of UN Special Rapporteurs, 
and the Birmingham initiative which was trying to influence the position of elected members of 
the Security Council in prevision of the crucial March 2016 Security Council meeting. The fourth 
section analyses specifically the practices inside the Security Council, focusing on the role of elected 
members. A specific conflation of factors, including the paralysis of the P-3 on this specific issue, 
enabled elected members to play a key role in bringing the cholera issue to the fore. Finally, we 
will conclude on the current ramifications of the politico-legal fight for other similar issues.  
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 1. Everyday Performance of International Practices at the UN Security Council 
The practice perspective explores everyday performance of international practices and how these 
practices help shape world policy outcomes.11 It looks at power as vested not in capabilities, but 
in social relations. As such, it examines at the configuration of actors on a specific issue or specific 
time, understanding the specific power of each actor as relational, intersubjective and social, 
constituted through interactions with other actors. Practice theory, as such, focuses on the 
‘enactment of power’12 and how power is played out on the everyday. 
The literature on the Security Council has tended to focus overwhelmingly on veto power, 
especially in debates on reform of the institution. Moreover, most accounts focus on P3 states, 
while elected members of the SC only constitute the background of studies. In these studies, 
practices of elected members are understood through their combined capacity to block 
resolutions.13 Up until 31 December 1965, the Security Council comprised six elected members, 
but following the demands of States newly admitted to the United Nations, mostly through 
ongoing processes of decolonization, the General Assembly decided to increase membership of 
the Security Council, through resolution 1991 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963. Since 1 January 1966, 
therefore, the Council has included 10 non-permanent members. The passage of substantive 
resolutions require nine affirmative votes, including the concurring vote of the five members with 
veto power. In this context, scholars have argued that elected members have only a very small 
probability of influence.14 The reform of the Security Council, especially under pressure from the 
Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) and the rival ‘Uniting for Consensus’ states, 
has focused almost exclusively on permanent seats, with the potential addition of elected members 
considered only as an after-thought to give more representation to regions such as Latin America 
and Eastern Europe.15 In these accounts, elected members of the UN Security Council wield little 
actual voting power, and as such are dismissed and overlooked from analyses.  
However, we argue here that the Security Council is a lived space, and while it is important to note 
that with the impossibility of member states to come to a consensus regarding the reform of the 
Security Council, most of the pressures to change have been managed through less formal means, 
including the changes to working methods of by interpreting the formal rules in new ways. This 
includes ‘Arria-Formula’ meetings - informal meetings between the Council and other stakeholders 
(e.g. non-governmental organizations and experts) who normally do not have the right to take the 
floor. It is also important to note that Security Council elections are bitterly disputed, hence 
underlining its ‘soft power’ value in the eyes of many member states. Member states wishing to 
exercise a two-year mandate on the Council launch into finely orchestrated campaigns, mobilizing 
significant resources.16  
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Hence, rather than solely focusing on the material representations of interests, we view the Security 
Council as a structured social space, where different actors struggle for dominant positions.17 This 
struggle is not only one driven exclusively by the permanent members, however ‘powerful’ they 
may be. This structured social space is composed of many levels of actors,18 and the practices 
structuring this space can evolve overtime, or depending on the specific issue at play. Hence, we 
move beyond the ‘black letter of treaties and charters’19 to a perspective that takes into account 
actual practices inside the Council. The value of an elected seat for states goes beyond its material 
dimension, to encompass the ‘ability to raise points of interest in discussions; to learn about the 
views of others and about the leanings of the Council on given issues; and to appear at the centre 
of important things.’20 It is this dimension that we will highlight in this article.  
 
2. The cholera outbreak and the legal challenge to the UN 
 
2.1 Background 
Haiti has been a test case for activism in the UN Security Council since the start of the 1990s. It 
was the first instance of the Security Council authorising the use of force to effect the restoration 
of democracy within a Member State through Resolution 940, and the extensive activism of the 
Security Council in the 1990s has been well documented by David Malone.21 In this article we 
focus on one discrete aspect of the UN involvement in Haiti, and of the Security Council’s 
involvement in resolving that issue. 
In October 2010 cholera broke out in Haiti for the first time in its recorded history.22 The first 
infections occurred in the Artibonite region. In the first three months, approximately 150,000 
people contracted cholera and 3,500 died. Within three years more than 8,000 people had died and 
over 670,000 individuals had been infected.23 The cause of the infection was traced to a UN 
peacekeeping base, where raw faecal matter flowed out of a broken pipe towards Meille River24 a 
tributary to the Artibonite River – the nation’s largest and most important river providing water 
to 1.5 million people. A new Nepalese battalion arrived in Haiti in October 2010 and was deployed 
to the Mirebalais camp.25 There is still confusion about whether or not the soldiers were tested for 
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cholera prior to their deployment.26 It has become clear, however, that cholera screening protocols 
were inadequate.27  
A team of researchers from the University of Maryland concluded that sanitation conditions in 
Haiti were a ‘perfect storm’ for the outbreak of a massive cholera epidemic,28 which the UN seized 
upon to deny responsibility for introducing cholera.29 However, the ‘perfect storm’ theory has been 
considered ‘a perfect lie’ by French epidemiologist Renaud Piarroux,30 who observed that there 
was no evidence provided ‘to counter that cholera was brought to Haiti by a contingent of 
Nepalese United Nations peacekeeping troops’.31 Piarroux and his team insist that all of the 
scientific evidence demonstrates that the cholera is attributable to the Nepalese contingent and 
that the epidemic was initiated by faecal contamination of a local stream draining into the 
Artibonite River.32 The link with the South Asian strain of cholera found in Nepal has been 
confirmed by numerous field investigations33 including the U.N.’s Independent Panel of Experts 
on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.34 It is now widely accepted that the cholera outbreak was directly 
attributable to Nepalese peacekeeping troops.35 
After the outbreak of cholera, the UN not only refused to take responsibility for introducing 
cholera, but also failed to take the necessary steps to contain and eradicate cholera in Haiti. 
According to a senior UN official with significant field experience in Haiti, the decision not to 
accept responsibility was based on the context within the country at that time: ‘Haiti was hanging 
by a thread at that time, particularly in terms of civil disobedience, and with no functioning police 
or jails after the earthquake. If the UN had admitted liability it would have been unable to help 
with all of the other issues going on at that time, so instead the UN said that it was waiting for 
scientific reports and evidence on cholera.’36 He also claimed that ‘many different factors 
contributed to the difficulty in dealing with the outbreak. First and foremost, the perception of 
UN being involved led to difficulty in helping possible victims, with staff being stoned and attacked 
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by local populations. The perception of UN involvement meant that many internationals, including 
those not working for the UN, were kept behind closed doors for their own safety, which meant 
that supplies did not get through to the people who needed them.’ 37 
Amongst the first responders to the cholera victims were staff members from Bureaux des 
Advocats International (BAI) and the Institute for Justice38 and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH).39 
Those linked organisations, based in Port au Prince and Boston respectively, are public interest 
lawyers who work in Haiti to implement human rights and rule of law, alongside their political 
objective of restoring Aristide as President. When it became clear that the UN was refusing to take 
responsibility for the outbreak, and was not taking sufficient steps to contain and eradicate the 
disease, BAI and IJDH began to collect testimonies and stories from cholera victims, their families, 
and their communities.40 According to Beatrice Lindstrom, an IJDH lawyer working in Haiti at 
that time, ‘we were all waiting for the UN to investigate and respond to cholera; especially when 
evidence emerged so quickly that the UN was responsible. But nothing happened.’41 She explained 
that the Haitians with whom they worked ‘knew immediately that the UN would not respond 
justly’ and that ‘connections were being made between cholera and past grievances against the UN. 
It was part of the same narrative that instances of abuse were not being responded to in a just 
way.’42 Despite that, IJDH and BAI decided ‘to just wait, because the evidence was so clear that 
we believed that the UN had to respond.’43 However, by late October the Haitian grassroots and 
diaspora were asking BAI and IJDH to help with cholera. They initially went to one village for a 
town hall meeting: ‘we were expecting 15 people to show up, but 300 people had come from all 
over to tell their stories about cholera and its impact. No-one had come to talk to them from the 
government or the UN or the NGOs. We were the first ones even to show up.’44 
Lindstrom and the team from BAI recorded information from everyone who came to that first 
town hall meeting, as they ‘realised from a humanitarian and accountability perspective that this 
information needed to be recorded.’45  It soon became apparent to them ‘that the healing process 
could not occur without accountability and without people’s voices being heard. We were not 
thinking about legal action, but simply about connecting with communities and giving voice to 
survivors.’46  However, in January 2011 the UN Secretary-General appointed a panel of experts, 
and the turning point for IJDH and BAI was when they saw the final report47 and ‘realised that 
the UN would not accept responsibility or be honest about the evidence. We realised that we 
needed to do something, to find a strategy for getting accountability from the UN.’48   
The decision to attempt to sue the UN represented a last-gasp attempt to influence the 
organisation to provide remedies or dispute resolution to Haiti’s cholera victims. Almost every 
legal expert acknowledged that the procedural bars preventing the UN being brought before a 
national court would not be overturned or circumvented. However, the lawsuit itself brought such 
strong and sustained publicity that it became pivotal as a piece of strategic litigation that achieved 
its aims outside of the courtroom. Before turning to the lawsuit as part of the overall advocacy 
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strategy, it is important to understand why the very idea of suing the UN was both radical and 
unlikely ever to succeed. 
 
2.2 The absolute immunity of the UN in question 
The United Nations may be viewed as a quasi-state in terms of its functions and internal legal 
systems,49 yet it is granted absolute immunity rather than the ‘restrictive’ immunity that is mostly 
afforded to states nowadays. Of course, international organisations’ immunity can be distinguished 
from that of states in terms of sources and rationale. State immunity has been an evolving concept 
now codified within the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunities, while international 
organisations’ immunity is usually enshrined within treaties specific to an organisation or within 
its constituent instrument, and usually is based on the UN’s immunities, which were enshrined in 
1946. This has restricted the extent to which such immunity can be interpreted or evolve. Absolute 
immunity was the prevailing theory up until the second half of the twentieth century. As such, 
when the UN was created it was afforded absolute immunity, which was subsequently enshrined 
in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946) (Hereafter CPIUN). 
Moreover, some would insist that even if that treaty was easy to amend, the UN needs to hold 
immunity from national courts’ jurisdiction in order to prevent inconsistencies that would occur 
across different national courts.50 Some scholars even have insisted that national courts or tribunals 
are ‘totally unsuited’ for disputes involving international organisations.51   
The UN’s immunity is based on the Charter of the United Nations: Article 105 (1) sets out that 
‘The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.’52 That provision does not set out 
absolute immunity,53 leading some commentators to insist that the UN was intended only to be 
granted functional immunity,54 but it has been interpreted as absolute immunity by states and by 
courts. A straightforward reading of the Charter indicates that the UN’s immunity is restricted by 
its human rights obligations under Articles 1(3), 55 and 56. Any actions that violate fundamental 
human rights to access a court and a remedy, and to truth, would contradict the UN’s purposes 
and certainly would not be ‘necessary’ for their achievement; it appears contradictory, at best, that 
the UN would hold immunity with regard to such acts. However, when the Charter provisions 
were elaborated upon in the CPIUN the immunity was interpreted as being absolute.  
Section 2 of the CPIUN establishes that:  
‘The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular 
case it has expressly waived its immunity.’55  
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Courts generally have interpreted Section 2 as granting absolute immunity to the United Nations.56 
This approach is based on the UN Charter and the General Convention pre-dating the move to 
restrictive immunity,57 meaning that even if the UN’s immunity was conceived of as functional it 
was codified as absolute. That approach can be seen, for example, in the early case of Manderlier v 
Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge58 (1966) and subsequently in a range of cases ranging 
from employment disputes59 to damages arising from peacekeeping operations.60 Traditional 
justification for the UN’s absolute immunity is that it would be undesirable for national courts to 
determine the legality of the UN’s acts because (a) those courts would have very different 
interpretations to one another; and (b) it may be open to prejudice or frivolous actions within 
some countries.61  
The wording in Section 2 is unambiguous, yet there remains the key problem that the UN’s 
absolute immunity can and does give rise to violations of individuals’ human rights. Even though 
a potential counterbalance is provided in Section 29 of the CPIUN, which requires the UN to set 
up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, courts have ruled that Section 2 is not dependent 
on Section 29 being implemented. Judges to date have determined that they are bound to grant 
immunity to the UN,62 but judicial comments within some cases demonstrate that this is not 
unproblematic especially where there are no other avenues for alternative dispute resolution 
through which an individual may exercise her/his right to access a court and a remedy.63 
2.3 The court cases 
As any good lawyer will acknowledge, the courtroom ought to be the last resort in any dispute. 
After BAI and IJDH had gathered stories and testimonies from cholera-affected communities, 
they first sought alternative dispute resolution from the UN in line with Section 29 of the CPIUN. 
The UN, first at MINUSTAH in Haiti and later at headquarters in New York, blocked attempts 
by BAI and IJDH to access alternative dispute resolution mechanisms on behalf of cholera 
victims.64 They were first told that no claims commission had been established for MINUSTAH 
despite the legal obligations contained within the SOFA Agreement signed between Haiti and the 
UN, which has provisions (section VIII, 55) on the establishment of Claims Commissions. 
Eventually the UN Office of Legal Affairs informed them that claims could be filed directly with 
MINUSTAH but did not provide any information about how to do so.65 In August 2011, after 
months of research, IJDH found a UN General Assembly Resolution with a claims form attached 
in the annex. Using that form, 5,000 victims filed claims in November 2011, petitioning for 
                                                          
56 Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts, (Cambridge: CUP. 2000), at 332. 
57 Rios & Flaherty, ‘Legal Accountability of International Organization: Challenges and Reforms’ (2010) 16 ILSA 
Journal of International and Comparative Law at 437. 
58 Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres), Brussels Civil Tribunal, 11 May 
1966, (1966) Journal des Tribunaux 721; (1972) 45 ILR 446. 
59 For example, Radicopoulos v United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Egyptian Court, 1957, Annual Report of the Director 
of UNWRA, 13 UN GAOR, Supp. (No.14) 41, UN Doc. A/391 (1958); Boimah v United Nations General Assembly, US 
District Court EDNY, 24 July 1987, 664 F. Suppl. 69 (EDNY 1987). 
60 For example, Abdi Hosh Askir v Boutros Boutros-Ghali, US District Court, Southern District, New York, 29 July 1996, 
933 F. Suppl. 368 (SDNY 1996).  
61 Sands, P. & Klein, P., Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (5th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), section 15-
045, at 491. 
62 Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, ‘International Organisations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: to Restrict or to Bypass’, 
51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002) at 2. 
63 See for example, Abdi Hosh Askir v Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1996), supra note 60 in which a Somali citizen brought a 
claim against the UN seeking damages for unlawful possession of property during UN operations in Somalia in April 
1992. See also Johnson, ‘Introductory Note to Brzak v. United Nations (2D CIR.) and Mothers of Srebrenica v 
Netherlands & United Nations (Neth. App. Ct.)’, 49 International Legal Materials, (2010) at 1012. 
64 IJDH, ‘Cholera Litigation: Frequently Asked Questions’, available at http://www.ijdh.org/cholera-litigation-
frequently-asked-questions/ 
65 Ibid. 
remedies in the form of eradicating cholera, compensation, and a public acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing.66 Although the Office of Legal Affairs acknowledged receipt of the claim form, there 
was no response from the UN to the cholera victims or their representatives.67 The UN’s Office 
of Legal Affairs, according to a senior UN official, is staffed with attorneys who ‘act as thought 
the UN is their client’.68 Once the claims were filed, UN staff were told not to discuss it on the 
record, and all political efforts to resolve the claims ceased ‘because everything freezes while the 
UN was waiting for case to be resolved.’69 
It took until February 2013 for the UN to respond, which it did by stating that the claims were 
‘not receivable pursuant to Section 29 [of the CPIUN]’ because the ‘consideration of these claims 
would necessarily include a review of political and policy matters.’70 The claimants asked for 
clarification of the grounds for the UN not receiving the claims, and sought alternative dispute 
resolution, all of which were refused. In October 2013, the case of Georges v. United Nations was 
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.71 Those claims 
were filed against the UN, MINUSTAH, the UN Secretary-General, and the former head of 
MINUSTAH. The claims were filed in New York because the UN is headquartered in that city, 
and because major decisions about cholera in Haiti were made in those headquarters.72 The court 
case was a class action suit filed on behalf of thousands of victims, something that could not occur 
in the Haitian court system.73 Although it was filed in 2013 the UN did not formally respond to 
the claims. Had it done so, that response would have been used to demonstrate that the UN did 
not hold absolute immunity from being brought before a national court. Instead, the UN asked 
the US Government, as the UN’s host nation, to seek dismissal of the case. In March 2014, the 
US Attorney submitted a Statement of Interest that insisted that the UN have absolute immunity 
in US courts,74 a position upheld by Judge Oetken in dismissing the case on 9 January 2015.75 A 
notice of appeal was filed on 12 February 2015, the oral arguments were heard on 1 March 2016, 
and on 18 August 2016 the Court upheld the UN’s immunity from claims.76 
The court cases filed were part of a strategic litigation tactic, aimed not only – or even fully – at 
winning a legal argument, but also at raising the profile and awareness of the plight of the Haiti 
cholera victims. While the lawyers in the case believed that they may have had a chance of 
bypassing UN immunity and thus succeeding in the claims being heard by a court,77 that work was 
only one part of a strategy designed to place political, legal, and even moral pressure on the UN to 
remedy the harms that it had caused. During the three years of the court cases and, indeed, the 
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two years prior to the initial claims being filed, many actors and stakeholders became involved with 
the efforts to place pressure on the UN to provide justice to the cholera victims. It is to those 
parallel activities that we will now turn, before exploring the subsequent instrumentalisation of the 
Security Council, and the role that played in securing justice.  
 
3. The Political Fight for Justice 
Holding accountable the UN is not a simple matter, or one that can occur quickly or easily, and it 
relies as much – if not more – on politics than on law. It requires many stakeholders coming 
together and pursuing separate and interlinked avenues. A key obstacle to finding a political 
resolution in the early years was that once the initial court case had been filed, the UN and its 
member states, under instructions from the UN Office for Legal Affairs, refused to discuss a 
political settlement for fear that it may prejudice or jeopardise the UN’s position that it held 
absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts.78 By the time that the appeal was filed 
in 2016 the landscape had changed significantly, with many member states recognising that there 
was almost no chance that UN immunity would not be upheld, and with many stakeholders inside 
and outside of the UN calling for justice for the victims. It is crucial to understand the role of the 
activities that took place in parallel to the court cases, and to understand the timing of those 
activities. Most significantly, the UN Secretary-General finished his term in December 2016, and 
pressure was placed on him to address the stain on his legacy of the failure to provide justice to 
the cholera victims. Secondly, from 2016 the UN Security Council was engaged in ending the UN 
stabilisation presence in Haiti, and transforming its presence to a rule of law, demilitarised 
operation. Thirdly, it was clear that if the appeal was not successful that IJDH was unlikely to seek 
appeal to the US Supreme Court. 
Key to resolving the cholera claims were the many different pressure points placed on the UN, 
including through law, politics, advocacy, and public pressure. In parallel to the strategic litigation 
there were significant efforts by many stakeholders – some public and some private – to encourage 
the UN to resolve the dispute. Key amongst those were the activities of UN human rights bodies 
and independent experts, in particular Philip Alston, academics including those involved with the 
Birmingham Initiative, and member states particularly the Elected Members of the Security 
Council and the Group of Friends of Haiti. At the heart of that work was the desire to ensure 
justice for the survivors, and in parallel to all of that work was public advocacy undertaken by all 
actors and entities involved with the fight for justice for cholera victims and survivors.   
The head of IJDH, Brian Concanon, emphasised that ‘The case also enables bringing in a huge 
network of people including academics, scientists, civil society organisations and others to become 
actors and advocates on cholera. The IJDH vision of the case is that no-one is independent, 
everyone is part of a broader connected network and everyone informs the advocacy.’79 The 
diplomatic, political and advocacy strategies were undertaken by different actors and stakeholders, 
with varying levels of formal or informal coordination with the one another and with the lawyers 
representing the cholera victims. Key actors included UN independent experts on human rights 
who placed private and public pressure on the UN Secretary-General, the former UN Office of 
Legal Affairs staff members who advised IJDH and BAI, academics who wrote amici briefs and 
academic work on the topic, physicians and public health experts, journalists who provided media 
coverage, and the victims who engaged with the UN and member states. Many of the activities of 
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those broad networks are on the public record, including the letters80 and reports written by UN 
independent experts, and the coverage by individual journalists such as Colum Lynch for Foreign 
Policy and Somini Sengupta for the New York Times. Other activities remain off the record, 
particularly where they involved senior members of the UN working for the Organisation at that 
time. 
 
3.1 Public Awareness 
One pressure point on the UN was raising awareness, within the UN and member states and 
amongst the wider public, of the cholera outbreak, the UN’s role, and the failure to provide justice 
to the victims. Initially little attention was paid to the issue by international media. However, in the 
two years after the outbreak scientific analyses,81 academic articles,82 and policy reports83 were 
published that provided key material for advocacy efforts. After the court cases were filed, media 
interest increased, as did the interest of civil society groups outside of the core organisations 
working in Haiti or within its diaspora populations. Initially coverage was limited to areas such as 
Miami where large Haitian diaspora live, Boston where IJDH is based, as well as some articles in 
New York where the claims were filed and in Washington where there was interest in the US 
defending the court case. By 2015 media coverage included regular articles in international media 
such as Foreign Policy, The Guardian, and the New York Times, as well as news channels such as 
Al-Jazeera, Channel 4, and France24.84 Academics, former UN staff members, former diplomats, 
and civil society groups regularly wrote and spoke out about Haiti and cholera, ensuring greater 
awareness and sustained attention on the fight for justice. The strategic litigation clearly was key 
to securing this level of public awareness, as the court cases provided a hook for stakeholder to 
understand and explore the key issues. Off the record, more than 5 interviewees within the UN 
spoke of the pressure placed on the Secretary-General by each major news story, in particular those 
that appeared in the New York Times. Awareness was also raised and pressure exerted by victims 
telling their stories to the media, to the UN, and to member states. One instrumental example was 
the letter-writing campaigns organised by IJDH and aimed at the UN and at its member states’ 
missions to UN headquarters,85 which many of the states we later met with referenced in their 
knowledge and understanding of the cholera claims.86  
 
3.2 UN Independent Experts on Human Rights 
UN independent experts on human rights are appointed specific thematic or country mandates 
for a fixed term. They are unpaid, and conduct their duties part-time with some logistical and 
research support from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Appointed by the 
Human Rights Council, those experts report to that body and to the General Assembly, and the 
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system of ‘Special Procedures’87 – the term for all of the mandate holders – is considered the 
‘crown jewel’ of the UN human rights system. Given their expertise and their status within the 
UN, key mandate holders were able to use their positions to place considerable pressure on the 
UN, and to raise awareness in UN human rights bodies in Geneva. 
On 25th September 2014 four mandate holders with particular interests in the cholera claims wrote 
to the UN Secretary-General to express concern about the way in which the UN was handling the 
claims. Those mandate-holders were responsible for (i) housing (Leilani Farha); (ii) Haiti (Gustavo 
Gallón), (iii) health (Dainius Pūras), and (iv) water and sanitation (Catarina de Albuquerque).88 The 
UN response was sent by Assistant-Secretary-General Pedro Medrano, Senior Coordinator for 
Cholera, in which he set out the UN’s legal arguments for not receiving the claims.89 That letter 
was significantly more detailed than any response given by the UN to the cholera victims or their 
lawyers either prior to or during the litigation.  
On 23 October 2015 the four original mandates (three being the same individuals, and the fourth 
on water and sanitation now being held by Leo Heller), joined by the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights (Philip Alston) again wrote to the UN Secretary-General. They 
expressed concern about victims being denied an effective remedy, and suggested that the UN 
hold informal consultations.90 The UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson responded on 25 
February 2016, after the appeal had been filed, welcoming the mandate holders’ offer ‘to engage 
further on this matter and discuss what further steps the United Nations could take, in keeping 
with its mandates, to assist the victims of cholera and their communities.’91 According to Alston, 
prior to that letter and to the appeal being filed, on 15 January 2016 ‘the Secretary-General met at 
UN Headquarters with the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty. Two issues were discussed, 
one of which was the importance of UN engagement in response to the cholera communication.’92  
The impact of the pressure from the UN independent experts cannot be underestimated, and 
continued after the Security Council meeting in March 2016 at which many member states for the 
first time in that body spoke out about the need for the UN to address cholera in Haiti. While we 
will go into that in detail in Section 4, it is crucial to understand that the continued public and 
private pressure from Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty, was instrumental in 
ensuring that the cholera claims were resolved. He had further meetings with the other mandate 
holders and with the Secretary-General, in April93 and June94 respectively, and wrote a report for 
the UN General Assembly that was sent to the Secretary-General on 8 August 201695 prior to the 
appeal court ruling, and that was officially published on 26 August 201696 after the appeal ruling 
upheld UN immunity. However, the blow to the victims of that appeal court ruling was somewhat 
softened by a front page story on that same day – 18 August 2016 – in The New York Times 
setting out ‘key details of the draft report and quoted a spokesman for the Secretary-General as 
saying in response that “over the past year, the U.N. has become convinced that it needs to do 
much more regarding its own involvement in the initial outbreak and the suffering of those 
affected by cholera,” and announcing that a “new response will be presented.’97 The efforts of 
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Alston and other mandate holders had a clear impact, and were crucial aspects of the activities 
parallel to the strategic litigation and that resulted in resolution of the dispute.  
 
3.3 Birmingham Initiative 
The Birmingham Initiative was another parallel activity that occurred as part of the global efforts 
seeking justice for the cholera victims. In 2013 we were approached by IJDH and asked to provide 
research on a human rights-based challenge to UN immunity from the jurisdiction of national 
courts.98 Together we fused our knowledge of Haiti, peacekeeping, unintended consequences of 
interventions, the UN, and human rights, to contribute to the activities seeking justice for the 
cholera victims. Our continued work with IJDH included writing an amici brief for the court, 
publishing and presenting academic work,99 writing media articles,100 and raising awareness in the 
public sphere.101 In August 2015, before the Appeals were filed, we agreed with IJDH to convene 
an independent expert workshop in Birmingham that would focus on parallel processes to take 
place while the appeals were filed and heard. Although supported by IJDH, the Birmingham 
workshop was convened and held independently of that organisation.  
The timing of the workshop was key because there was a need to provide an alternative political 
solution for dispute resolution that could be table when the appeals were filed. All actors and 
stakeholders were aware that if the appeals were not successful, which was likely given the 
procedural bar of UN immunity, there was a short period of time in which to place pressure on 
the UN Secretary-General before his term came to an end. Attendees included current and former 
senior UN officials, UN independent experts on human rights, and experts on epidemiology, water 
and sanitation, humanitarian responses, and transitional justice. Attendees came from all regions 
of the world, and included individuals from Haiti and from regional allies in neighbouring 
countries. The workshop aimed to produce a broad resolution framework that might be acceptable 
to and accepted by all parties, that would take into account the local context, and that might serve 
as a starting point for political and diplomatic discussions in parallel to the legal processes going 
through the New York court system. The workshop, held in December 2015, produced a draft 
resolution framework (Appendix I) and an executive summary (Appendix II). Broadly, the three 
parts of that resolution framework were: (a) an apology and an acknowledgment that the UN 
caused harm, (b) reparations or remedies for the victims, and (c) elimination of cholera in Haiti.  
In March 2016, soon after the oral arguments were heard by the Appeals Court, a small 
representative delegation from the Birmingham Initiative visited New York to undertake bilateral 
diplomatic meetings with states seized with the Haiti cholera situation, and with key UN personnel. 
The purpose of those meetings was to present the draft resolution framework as a potential starting 
point for the basis of diplomatic negotiations. That framework represented only the expertise of 
individuals at the Birmingham workshop, and was used to move the conversations beyond the 
usual phrasing that ‘something ought to be done’ and towards a discussion of what that something 
might look like in practice. The timing of the visit was a few weeks before the UN Security Council 
mid-year review of MINUSTAH, with the aim of ensuring that justice for cholera victims was 
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discussed at that Council session. In all, the delegation met with 8 members of the UN Security 
Council and another 7 countries with strong links to Haiti. As a result of those meetings and of 
other parallel activities, 11 of the 15 Council members raised the issue of cholera during that 
Council session, and many of those states became central to the efforts to secure justice for the 
victims. 
 
4. The Security Council and its elected members 
 
4.1 When the P3 decides to take a back seat 
One of the sources of power of the permanent members of the Security Council is their ability to 
chair ‘informal sessions’, where the ‘real work of the Council takes place.’102 These sessions do not 
need to be open to elected members, as they are not official meetings, and the work done in these 
informal meetings structures the official meetings, making them a ‘proforma affair, scripted in 
these advance informal consultations.’103 This is particularly true in the case of Haiti, with dynamics 
within the Security Council regarding Haiti illustrating the dominance of its five permanent 
members, and the importance of the US within that group.104 According to former Canadian 
Ambassador to the UN, David Malone, ‘non-permanent members influence the course of events, 
often by participating in Groups of Friends, but theirs are not the key voices.’105 The key voices 
tend to be the P3, and especially the US in the case of Haiti. However, in a rather unusual 
configuration, none of the Permanent Members were willing to take the lead on the cholera issue 
in 2016. In bilateral meetings with France, the UK, and the US, different reasons were set out for 
each country neither supporting nor blocking resolution of the Haiti Cholera Claims. This allowed 
space for the Elected Members to take the lead in calling for a political resolution and for justice 
without being blocked by the Permanent Members or losing political capital with those states. 
The US remained largely silent on this issue because, as the host nation to the UN headquarters, 
it was tasked with defending UN immunity from the jurisdiction of its New York courts. Hence, 
the main focus of the American delegation was on the court cases, and on the potential precedents 
any recognition of liability could create for other cases of ‘unintended consequences’ of 
peacekeeping operations. The reticence of the American delegation, usually in the leading seat 
regarding Haitian issues, was clearly the crucial factor in opening up political space for other actors 
– first and foremost the elected members of the Security Council and other member states – to 
play a role in the settlement of the cholera issue. France, with its history in Haiti, was unwilling to 
speak out on behalf of the need for compensations of victims of cholera – which may have led to 
entangle the issue with the slave-reparations to the country. This happened in a context of the first 
formal visit of a French President in Haiti, in May 2015, which put the ‘independence debt’ of 
Haiti back in the news.106 Finally, the UK has little, if any, interest in Haiti as a former-Francophone 
colony halfway across the world. The UK was also similarly worried about the legal liability of the 
organisation, as well as the potential precedent this would set.  
Russia and China paid little interest to Haiti or to the cholera victims, with both countries opposed 
to human rights being brought into the body’s work, and with their attention focused firmly on 
ensuring that resolutions on Syria were blocked or even not tabled during those years. Russia did 
pay attention to Haiti in the past, but more to ensure that the UNSC would reciprocate, seeking 
endorsement for other peacekeeping operations in countries ‘of interest’ for Russia (including 
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Georgia or Tajikistan in the 1990s).107 China traditionally saw Haiti through the prism of its 
tensions with Taiwan. 
 
4.2 The battle for predominance by elected members of the Security Council and the Group 
of Friends of Haiti 
When the ‘powerful states’ do not use the Security Council to either pass or block Resolutions, it 
‘creates an opening for weaker agents to appropriate and manipulate the meaning of the 
symbols.’108 The elected members can then act as agents of ‘discursive power’, understood as the 
ability to promote and impose concepts as the basis of preferred policies.  Of course, the extent 
to which those actions may lead to legally binding Security Council action relies upon the 
Permanent Members, which was not tested in this case. As Langmore and Farrall argue, ‘the litmus 
test of effectiveness for elected members is whether and how they are able to adapt to the 
constraints and make the most of their limited opportunities to promote their desired outcomes.’109 
Elected members of the Security Council clearly passed the test in our test case, seizing the 
opportunity offered by the P-3 silence, hence demonstrating that strategic and innovative non-
members can contribute to and influence UN Security Council outcomes in a variety of ways.110 
Each state have their own agenda, and it is interesting to note how these agendas played out in the 
context of the Haitian issue.  
Of the elected members of the Security Council, key allies for the initiative included Venezuela, a 
country that credits Haiti with creating the environment in which it and other nearby states became 
free from colonial rule. Indeed, until the recent economic crisis in Venezuela, it provided 
significant economic support for Haiti. Venezuela is also a member of the Group of Friends of 
Haiti. Venezuela played a key role in the process, liaising with other Latin American member states 
and playing a key role in raising the issue at the Council.  
Outside of the Security Council membership, other states took a keen interest in the initiative and 
used their political capital to encourage elected members to champion the cause. This is especially 
true for the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General for Haiti (hereafter referred to as ‘The 
Group of Friends’), a particularly dynamic group influencing governance in the Security Council. 
Already in 1995, Boutros-Boutros Ghali explained that “a new concept, that of ‘Friends of the 
Secretary-General’ (…) means that, while the UN peacekeepers are on the ground, intense 
diplomatic efforts continue with many parties to a conflict in order to reach a political 
settlement.”111 After the military coup that ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, the Group of 
Friends was established approximately in January 1993112 with four states with long-standing 
economic and other ties with Haiti as members: France, Canada and the US, along with 
Venezuela.113 These four countries were to form a loose alliance in support of democracy in Haiti. 
When the United Nations reengaged in Haiti in 2004, a larger core group – including many troop-
contributing countries from Latin America - was formed even as the Friends of Haiti drove the 
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decision making in the Security Council.114 The Group of Friends of Haiti has steered the Haiti 
issue in the UNSC since 1993.115  
Uruguay at that time chaired the Group of Friends of Haiti, and was a member of the Security 
Council. Canada, which closely supported Uruguay’s role in the Group of Friends, alongside Brazil 
and Mexico who play key roles in that Group, were not members of the Security Council but were 
key allies to many states sitting at the Council. Uruguay was very keen on the idea of including 
questions on the cholera issue in the Security Council debates, and was pleased to coordinate with 
other Latin American states, including Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, or Brazil. Chileans were also very 
supportive of the initiative, noting how the cholera issue ‘changed their approach to 
peacekeeping’.116 Canada also felt it was a cause that was ‘worth pursuing’ and an important 
initiative and played a key role in promoting a political resolution of the issue.117 Mexico was 
particularly keen in taking the initiative forward, and played a key role with Canada in bringing the 
discussion forward in the absence of P3 involvement by liaising with other Latin American states. 
In the case of Mexico, the regional rivalry with Brazil was certainly clear, particularly with Brazil’s 
key contribution to MINUSTAH and its use as a springboard for regional and international 
legitimacy. While Mexico was very vocal in its support of the issue, its mid-term position remained 
somewhat unclear, especially whether its support for pushing the issue forward was simply a 
reflection of the rivalry for influence in the region.  
Sweden has very few ties with Haiti, but also became an instrumental actor in this initiative largely 
owing to the personal connections,118 and especially because of their connection with Deputy 
Secretary General Jan Eliasson, a key player in UN politics. While Haiti was not a Swedish priority, 
reputational damage to the UN was. As such, and tying this issue with other unintended 
consequences of peacekeeping such as sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, the Swedish 
representation wanted to make sure that ‘the UN did the right thing’ in this context.119 The Haitian 
delegation was lacking direction at the time, after the annulation of the October 2015 Presidential 
ballot. Hence, the Haitian Ambassador was not able to take instructions from Port-au-Prince, but 
nevertheless was highly receptive of the initiative and supported a political resolution of the 
issue.120  
 
4.3 The Security Council Mid-Year Review of MINUSTAH: from a humanitarian to a human 
rights issue 
At the March 2016 UN Security Council mid-year review of MINUSTAH, the cholera issue, and 
even the issue of the source of the epidemic and the need for a new approach, was distinctly raised. 
The meeting, as is the case for all review meetings of peace operations, was meant to provide a 
contact point between the Secretary General and his representative in Haiti, and Council members 
over the performance of the mission and challenges faced on the ground. The most important 
issue raised by all parties was the stalled electoral process at the time, but mentions of cholera did 
not go unnoticed. Most Council members raised the issue along the traditional line of the 
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humanitarian challenge posed by cholera, which is how cholera has been discussed at the UN 
Security Council in previous meetings, but some elected members did raise the cholera issue as a 
human rights issue. This was a pivotal moment in relation to Haiti and cholera, as it represented 
the first time that states had publicly called for the UN to ensure justice for the victims. Rather 
than this issue being raised by stakeholders outside of the UN or by the UN’s independent human 
rights experts, its member states were breaking the years of silence on cholera, and sending a clear 
message to the Secretary-General and his team. The need for a new approach was carried loud and 
clear by specific elected members, as permanent members decided to frame the cholera issue as a 
humanitarian issue.  
Interestingly enough, the Security Council Report published ahead of the March meeting,121 
considered by a former diplomat who operated at the Security Council as a “highly valuable 
reservoir of virtual institutional memory on which the E10 diplomats (and probably those from 
the P5) repeatedly draw,”122 did not forecast any discussion on a new approach to deal with the 
cholera issue in its briefing, or on compensations and reparations to victims, with only a brief 
mention in the reports of the humanitarian challenge posed by the illness. The Special 
Representative of the Secretary General, Ms. Sandra Honoré, opened up the March meeting with 
her briefing of the situation of the country, in which there was not a single mention of the cholera 
issue. She also presented, as it is the tradition, the Secretary General Report on Haiti, which only 
included references to cholera as a humanitarian issue – looking at prevention and containment of 
the illness, but without mentioning the political issue of reparation and compensations to victims. 
The framing of cholera as a humanitarian issue was also shared by P-5 states at the meeting. The 
representative of the United Kingdom mentioned “that terrible disease is a scar on Haitian citizens. 
After all that they have been through, they cannot afford to fact that further assault on their lives 
and livelihoods.”123 The framing of cholera as humanitarian issue also shared by the French 
delegation, mentioning that “we must do more as an international community to eradicate cholera 
in Haiti once and for all.”124 The representative of the Russian Federation also mentioned his 
concern for “the unstable situation that has resulted from cholera,”125 without getting into 
specifics, and the American and Chinese representatives did not raise the cholera issue. The 
framing of cholera as a humanitarian issue was also shared by certain non-permanent members 
and other invited states in their formal statements, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Peru (on behalf of the Group of Friends), Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (on behalf of CARICOM), Ukraine, and Uruguay.  
However, other non-permanent members raised the issue of cholera through a human rights lens 
and the need for a new approach from the UN. In the formal statements, the clearest message 
came from the representative of Malaysia, who said that “we would encourage greater engagement 
by the Secretariat with those [cholera] victims, particularly on the issue of possible remedies and 
compensations, where appropriate. It is important for the continuing credibility of and respect for 
the United Nations as a whole that the Secretary-General exercise and demonstrate leadership on 
this issue, including by responding to the letter of allegations from the Human Rights Council 
special procedures.”126 The representative of New Zealand also mentioned that “the United 
Nations must continue to support those affected in Haiti and take appropriate action to help close 
that chapter and ensure that the new Government is not left alone to address the ongoing 
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consequences and political legacy of the outbreak”.127 The representative of Venezuela further 
mentioned that “the grave human impact of the emergence and spread of cholera since 2010 
cannot be ignored.”128  
Soon after the Security Council session, a delegation from the Organisation of Americas States 
visited Haiti, and cholera was high on their list of discussion points, and many of those countries 
continued to be seized of the issue of how to provide justice for cholera victims. Alongside those 
efforts, many states raised the issue at the UN Human Rights Council during the March 2016 
session, partly in response to the report of the Independent Expert on Haiti who repeated his 
recommendations on resolving the cholera claims,129 but also because they had been briefed by 
their missions in New York. After the Secretary General introduced his new approach to cholera 
in Haiti, most importantly underlining the political question behind the issue, the next semi-annual 
review of MINUSTAH at the Security Council saw a number of representations discussing the 
political nature of the issue. As the representative of Uruguay mentioned, “we welcomed with great 
satisfaction the new United Nations approach to cholera, and in our capacity as Chair of the Group 
of Friends of Haiti, we coordinated the efforts towards the adoption of General Assembly 
resolution 71/161, which welcomed that new approach. Today, we also welcome the references 
to cholera contained in the report of the Secretary-General, in particular the reference to the certain 
political role for the new mission, in complement to the efforts of the United Nations country 
team.”130 
 
5. Conclusion: what happened next 
The role of the elected members of the Security Council alongside other key stakeholders at that 
pivotal period of time was clearly instrumental in the UN changing its policy and approach to the 
cholera victims. It remains impossible to separate and isolate the influence of the elected members 
of the Security Council from other parallel activities – including the role of the UN Special 
Rapporteurs or the global advocacy campaign at that time. However, the UN Security Council 
mid-year review of MINUSTAH was clearly a very important diplomatic moment, with a number 
of states voicing their support for a different approach to the cholera issue. The meeting worked 
as a catalyst for pushing the agenda forward, underlining the fact that a broad number of regions 
represented at the Security Council favoured a different approach for the UN than hiding behind 
diplomatic immunity.    
However, despite the UN Secretary-General appointing a task force on cholera in September 2016, 
and his apology to cholera victims at the end of that year, to date the UN has not provided remedies 
to the victims, and it has not contained cholera in Haiti. The U.N. agreed on a $2.2 billion plan to 
eradicate cholera, but this occurred too late and remains significantly underfunded. There are many 
factors underpinning these failures, ranging from lack of funding from member states, a retreat 
from multilateralism by the US, a new Secretary-General who is not seized of this matter, and 
ongoing instability and development needs in Haiti. Regardless of those factors, the fact remains 
that nearly eight years after cholera first broke out in Haiti, victims are still waiting for justice. As 
one cholera victim told us in 2017: ‘I am not asking for much, all I want is some money to replace 
the goats I had to sell to take my sick child to hospital. Without those goats I cannot afford to 
educate that child. Apologies do not cure diseases.’ 
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